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THE STERLING ACT: A BRIEF
HISTORY
INTRODUCTION
As the City of Philadelphia approaches the new
millennium, the Mayoral election poses a number
of challenges before the electorate. Issues such
as education reform, crime, and population trends
lie atop candidates’ agendas. Another issue of
prime importance is the local income tax climate
within the Greater Philadelphia region. The City
of Philadelphia currently imposes residential and
non-residential income tax rates of 4.84 and 4.208
percents, respectively. From its inception in 1939,
the wage tax has grown considerably. The levy is
now the city’s single largest revenue provider.
Despite the wage tax’s revenue generation
capacity, the levy has inadvertently weakened
the region’s economic health. In addition to
federal transportation and housing policy,
technological advance, and a decline in the city’s
manufacturing base, imposition of the city wage
tax has contributed to a steady population
decline within Philadelphia’s borders. In 1950, the
city’s population totaled 2,071,605. By 1996, the
population had dwindled to 1,478,002.
Although urban population decline has been a
national phenomenon, studies have linked wage
tax increases to a decline in jobs, and ultimately
residents within Philadelphia. For example, a 1992
study by Professor Robert P. Inman of the
University of Pennsylvania attributed a loss of
100,000 jobs since 1966, to the city wage tax. He
also demonstrated that a 20 percent increase in
the city’s average wage tax rate would lead to the
loss of approximately 80,600 jobs.1
Meanwhile, as the population has flocked to the
suburbs, surrounding municipalities have been
forced to increase service provision. Due to limits
imposed upon their income taxing authority, local
                                                                
1  Inman, Robert P.  “Can Philadelphia Escape its
Fiscal Crisis with Another Tax Increase?”
Business Review: Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia  Sep./Oct. 1992, pg. 5 - 20.
jurisdictions have turned to property tax
increases in order to meet the demands of these
growing constituencies. The sum of Greater
Philadelphia’s various tax inequities is a great
deal of intra-regional economic disparity, as well
as limited economic growth when compared on
an inter-regional basis. In order to understand
why Greater Philadelphia’s patchwork tax climate
exists in its current state, its needlework must
first be unwoven.
One of the major blocks upon which the current
tax structure rests is the Sterling Act (P.L. 45).
The first version of P.L. 45 stated:
From and after the effective date of this act, the
council of any city of the first or second class
shall have the authority by ordinance, for
general revenue purposes, to levy, assess and
collect or provide for the levying, assessment
and collection of such taxes on persons,
transactions, occupations, privileges, subjects
and personal property, within the limits of such
city of the first or second class.
Passed in 1932, the Sterling Act effectively
conferred Philadelphia and Pittsburgh with the
authority to impose taxes on a variety of
conditions so long as they are not “now or
hereafter become subject to a State tax or license
fee.”2  The Sterling Act was also the first local
income tax enabling legislation in the
Commonwealth’s history. The amorphous
manner in which the Sterling Act was written has
provided opponents and proponents of the
legislation with a great deal of interpretive and
implementation flexibility over the years. In
addition to the Sterling Bill, a number of other
forces have helped shape Greater Philadelphia’s
local income tax structure. In particular, one must
examine three formative factors on a time series
basis:
1) State government actions/legislation
2) City government actions/legislation
3) Court cases and decisions
This paper seeks to discern the various
movements and decisions in these three areas
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which have led to the current application as well
as the net-effects of local income tax policy
within Greater Philadelphia. Legislative action
and court decisions will be analyzed by decade in
order to understand how the public sentiment
towards local taxing authority and its related
legislation have changed over time.
THE 1930’S
In 1932, Pennsylvania was mired in the depth of
the Great Depression. Government at all levels
was facing increasing budget deficits; increasing
unemployment and decreasing tax revenues. In
the spring of 1932, Representative Sterling of
Philadelphia introduced House Bill 214 that
served as the initial basis for what would become
P.L. 45. According to transcripts of the debate at
various points, Councilman Harry J. Trainer of
Philadelphia conceived the original idea behind
the Sterling Act. Trainer, as well as other
supporters of the bill, believed that conferring the
power to tax to Philadelphia and Pittsburgh
would allow the cities to alleviate many of the
problems emanating from the depression. On July
23, 1932, Senator Salus (Philadelphia) stated, “I
believe it [the Sterling Act] is the salvation of
Philadelphia, and that we will be able to take care
of our poor; and the one man to whom we all
ought to be thankful is Harry J. Trainer of
Philadelphia.”3
The original version of Sterling’s bill intended to
allow first class cities, second class cities, and
boroughs the taxing powers as stated by the
legislation. By the time the bill arrived at the
Governor’s desk, taxing authority was limited
only to first-and second class cities. In 1932, as is
the case now, Philadelphia was the state’s only
first class city; Pittsburgh was the only second
class city. Although it is difficult to complete the
thoughts and debate that circulated at the time, it
is possible to infer, based upon population
distributions, that the Harrisburg power structure
in the 1930’s rested in the hands of Philadelphia
and Pittsburgh legislators. As a result, they may
have possessed the authority and numbers to
restrict the application of the Sterling Act to first
and second class cities. The bill received almost
                                                                
3   Pennsylvania Legislative Journal, July 23, 1932,
pg. 665.
unanimous support as it moved through its
various stages. On August 5, 1932, Governor
Pinchot signed the Sterling Act into law. The
legislation was signed with a three-year sunset
provision applicable to second class cities.
The Sterling Act’s passage occurred without a
great deal of fanfare. The bill was only one aspect
of the Governor’s 14-point harmony program - an
all-encompassing series of legislative acts
designed to alleviate budgetary problems that
had plagued Philadelphia’s government for
several years. Nevertheless, alert Philadelphia
City Council members immediately recognized the
taxing potential. According to the August 6, 1932
Philadelphia Bulletin, “Council leaders intend to
take advantage of this authority at once, to
formulate a program that will produce sufficient
revenue to offset the huge and growing deficit in
the budget...to obtain money to help the
unemployed.” At the time, tax proposals ranged
from levies on clinical service at city hospitals to
taxes on hot-dog stands.4
By November of 1932, the first version of a city
wage tax was introduced to a great deal of
opposition. The initial legislation was crafted by
the City’s Chamber of Commerce in order to
compensate for a foreseeable $20 million deficit in
the 1933 city budget. The proposal, which would
have imposed a 0.5 percent payroll tax on “the
gross earned income of every person residing or
employed or engaged in business...within the
territorial limits of Philadelphia”, was met by
fierce hostility from citizens, particularly labor
groups. As a result, the City Council
unanimously (by a vote of 17-0) killed the
legislation on November 14, 1932. According to
Bernard Samuel, Finance Committee Chairman,
the bill was “buried so deep, you won’t find it in
10,000 years.”5
The Chairman’s warning did not last as long as
intended. In 1937, the idea of a city wage tax was
reintroduced. The city’s budget difficulties were
lingering and still growing. Based upon the
proposal’s initial failure in 1932, legislators
rewrote the bill to make it more politically feasible.
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This time, the tax was extended to those who
earned a living within Philadelphia but lived
outside the city borders. This addition, combined
with the dire need of financial rescue, made the
1937 legislation a more palatable option for
legislators and citizens alike. Councilmember
Edward A. Kelley declared, “In principle, such a
proposal is a fair and equitable means of raising
necessary additional revenue, and about 200,000
non-residents who earn their living here would
pay a pro rata share of the cost of Philadelphia
government.”
The city’s first wage tax imposition of one and
one-half percent was finally approved (17-3 vote)
on December 13, 1939 and Philadelphia became
the first city in the nation to impose an income
tax.6  According to newspaper articles, wage tax
supporters in academic and legislative circles
intended the tax to be a temporary measure.
THE 1940’S
The 1940’s were the beginning of a wave of legal
and legislative challenges against Philadelphia’s
                                                                
6   “Tax on Earnings Passes 17 to 3.”  Philadelphia
Bulletin 13 Dec. 1939.
wage tax. At the same time, the city was profiting
immensely from the newly imposed levy. In 1940,
the city collected over $16 million in revenue at a
1.5 percent rate. Chart 1-A demonstrates that
revenues actually increased through the 1940’s,
despite a rate decrease.
The Philadelphia wage tax was an innovative and
highly productive revenue generation
mechanism. In the October 6, 1942 edition of
Citizen’s Business, the Pennsylvania Economy
League wrote, “it [wage tax] reaches, as perhaps
nothing else could, that large group of persons
who earn their living in the city, but live beyond
its borders. There is a growing feeling that some
way must be found by our large cities to make
these non-residents share in meeting the cost of
government of the communities in which they
earn their living.”7  The wage tax had also helped
the City of Philadelphia balance its budget.
While Philadelphia was enjoying the fruits of the
newly imposed levy, outside interests were
mounting campaigns to reduce or eliminate the
city’s wage taxing power. The Camden County
Board of Freeholders, Camden County Mayors
                                                                
7   “To the Credit of the City’s Earned Income
Tax.”  Citizen’s Business 6 Oct. 1942:  No. 1585.
Chart 1-A - City of Philadelphia General Fund Revenues, Expenditures; General Property Tax & Wage Tax













& Net Profits Tax
Revenue ($1,000)
Wage, Earnings
& Net Profit Tax
Rate (%)
1940 NA NA NA 16, 283 1.5
1945 NA NA 42,600 22,430 1.0
1950 NA NA 50,305 37,542 1.25
1955 165,544 161,099 63,272 50,189 1.25
1960 216,408 219,594 84,538 70,934 1.5
1965 271,918 278,880 99,593 90,869 1.625
1970 462,481 459,165 112,372 212,067 3.0
1975 698,665 725,453 107,985 302,295 3.3125
1980 1,123,674 1,085,652 202,171 557,933 4.3125
1985 1,586,048 1,477,040 228,336 745,500 4.96 *
1990 1,925,118 1,833,960 314,051 927,554 4.96
1995 2,143,048 2,039,329 339,534 847,527 4.96
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Association, and the Wage Tax Protest League
all began drives in the early 1940’s to repeal
Philadelphia’s wage tax application to residents
of other states.
Philadelphia’s Mayor Samuel refused to concede
to the argument that implied “taxation without
representation.” and the New Jersey drive faced
defeats on a number of ends. In 1943, Howard
Kiker, a New Jersey resident who worked at the
Philadelphia Naval Yard, filed suit against the
City of Philadelphia on the basis of the
constitutionality of the tax. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court ruled that “the income tax
ordinance of the City of Philadelphia as applied
to New Jersey resident employed by federal
government at Philadelphia Navy Yard on League
Island is not unconstitutional as depriving him of
property without ‘due process of law’ on theory
that he received no benefit or protection from city
where all benefits of facilities of Philadelphia were
legally available to him.”8  The U.S. Supreme
Court would later refuse to hear appeals filed by
the Wage Tax Protest League on two occasions.9
The embattled New Jersey residents were
rendered to a state legislature resolution, which
called for Congress to enact legislation to
prevent Philadelphia from levying the wage tax
upon New Jersey residents.
A number of internal movements within
Pennsylvania also waged a losing war against the
Philadelphia wage tax in the 1940’s. Philadelphia
Councilman Eugene J. Hagerty introduced a bill
to reduce the wage tax rate to 1 percent. The bill
failed to reach the Council floor by a vote of 16 to
3.10  In 1942, the Pennsylvania Superior Court
upheld a ruling by Municipal Court Judge Joseph
G. Tumolillo in Schaller-vs. -City of Philadelphia,
which affirmed the City’s authority to impose the
wage tax on federal employees. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court upheld the ruling as well.11  In
March of 1943, the Pennsylvania House of
Representatives debated House Bill 16 - “an act
                                                                
8   Kiker v. City of Philadelphia.  31 A.2d 289, 346
Pa. 624 (1943).
9   “Wage Tax Fight Expanded.”  Philadelphia
Bulletin 31 Dec. 1943.
10  “U.S. Test of City Wage Tax Sought.”
Philadelphia Bulletin 17 Apr. 1942.
11  “Wage Tax Ruling Appealed.”  Philadelphia
Bulletin 6 Apr. 1942.
prohibiting any political subdivision from
imposing any wage income or occupation tax on
non-residents.”  On March 15, the bill failed by a
vote of 108 - 73.
Opponents of the bill asserted that Philadelphia
was providing a favor to non-residents through
provision of high-income jobs and payment of
the wage tax was one, small method of
retribution. For example, Representative Salus
(Philadelphia) stated, “They [Main Line residents
who work in Philadelphia] are by far in the
majority the ordinary worker. They can well
afford to pay this tax if they want to receive the
high pay they get in Philadelphia, and the
conditions we have in Philadelphia... The
proportion of taxes paid by the surrounding
counties to the city of Philadelphia is so small
that they ought to be happy and contented to
make their small contributions to make this
arsenal of American a successful, financial city
and save it from going into the red.”12  Despite
failed attempts to change aspects of the Sterling
Act, legislators circumvented Philadelphia’s
income tax authority by passing another
formative income tax bill.
In order to fully understand local income tax
policy with respect to the Southeastern
Pennsylvania region, the 1947 “Tax Anything
Act” must be taken into consideration. On June
25, 1947, Governor Duff signed Act No. 481 into
law. Act 481 empowered “cities of the second
class, cities of the second class A, cities of the
third class, boroughs, towns, townships of the
first class, school districts of the second class,
school districts of the third class and school
districts of the fourth class to levy, assess, and
collect or to provide for the levying, assessment
and collection of certain additional taxes subject
to maximum limitations for general revenue
purposes.”
Act 481 provided most municipalities within the
Commonwealth the same taxing powers that were
conferred upon Philadelphia via the Sterling Act.
The purpose of this bill was to provide local
governments with greater tax collection equity.
At the time of passage, the Governor stated,
“Real estate in most local communities of
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Pennsylvania has borne almost the entire cost of
government. In many communities, real estate
represents only a portion of the value of the
property in the community.”13  The legislation
also explicitly provided municipal governments
with the power to tax non-residents.
One portion of Act 481 would later come to play
the most significant role in shaping tax disparities
between Philadelphia and its surrounding
suburbs. It stated the following:
Payment of any tax to any political subdivision
pursuant to an ordinance or resolution passed
or adopted prior to the effective date of this act
shall be credited to and allowed as a deduction
from the liability of taxpayers for any like tax
respectively on salaries, wages, commissions,
other compensation or on net profits of business,
professions or other activities and for any
income tax imposed by any other political
subdivision of this Commonwealth under the
authority of this act.
At the time of Act 481, Philadelphia was the only
city with the authority to impose a local income
tax. Act 481 exempted non-residents of
Philadelphia who paid the Philadelphia wage tax
from paying the wage tax respective to their area
of residence. This essentially neutralized the
revenue generation potential of Philadelphia’s
surrounding communities since most employees
were still subject to the Philadelphia wage tax. It
is conceivable that inclusion of Philadelphia’s
pre-emption within the “Tax Anything Act”
became the basis for some of the suburban-urban
antagonism that has existed in the Greater
Philadelphia region. Until major employers began
transplanting in Suburban counties,
Philadelphia’s neighbors had relatively
insignificant income tax bases.
Thanks to a rising tide of new taxes, opposition
to the “Tax Anything Act” began to mount in the
late 1940’s. Senator G. Robert Watkins (R -
Delaware County) introduced an amendment to
exempt non-residents from the wage levies of any
                                                                
13   Roberts, A. H. “Home Tax Powers Won’t
Make a Hit with Local Officials Seeking Re-
Election.”  Philadelphia Bulletin  29 Jun. 1947.
state municipalities except Philadelphia.14
Although Watkins proposal initially failed, a
number of amendments to the “Tax Anything
Act” were passed in 1949. The most important
amendments were:
1) A one- percent cap on wage tax levies
2) A ban on non-resident wage taxes applicable
to second, third, and fourth class school districts
The one- percent cap would later lead policy
experts and civic leaders to call for Philadelphia
to reimburse surrounding counties one percent of
wage taxes collected from non-residents. The cap
has also imposed difficulties upon suburban
municipalities with expanding populations. At a
time when greater funds are required to pay for
increasing service demands, property tax rate
hikes are the only conceivable revenue
generation mechanism for many municipalities.
Despite the opposition and limitations imposed
upon the bill, the popularity of wage taxes spread
throughout the state. By 1951, 250 political
subdivisions were levying a municipal income
tax.15  Opponents of the Philadelphia wage tax
gained a victory in 1949 as Common Pleas Court
No. 1 ruled that Philadelphia could not extend the
wage tax to investment profits. The basis for
Judge Kun’s ruling was that the wage tax is “not
a general income tax” and is limited to wages and
net earned profits from the operation of
business.16
THE 1950’S
The 1950’s continued to be a time of turmoil for
Pennsylvania taxing municipalities. Although no
major legislative changes were implemented, the
Pennsylvania House of Representatives again
attempted to repeal the non-residential wage tax
provisions authorized by the Sterling Act and
Act 481. This repeal attempt stalled and died in
Senate committee as did a suburban-sponsored
                                                                
14  “Local Tax Bill Facing Fight.” Philadelphia
Bulletin 23 Apr. 1949.
15  “250 Political Subdivisions in State Levy
Income Tax.” Philadelphia Bulletin  25 Sep. 1951.
16  “Court Rules Out City Tax on Investments.”
Philadelphia Bulletin  9 May 1949.
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attempt to allow Philadelphia suburban
municipalities to lay claim to the first one percent
of the Philadelphia wage tax.
The most significant court ruling of the 1950’s
was Lefferts-vs. -City of Philadelphia. The
decision stated that Section 15971 “does not
empower the City of Philadelphia to levy a tax on
that portion of the gross income of persons
engaged in a profession in Philadelphia received
for services rendered outside Philadelphia.”17
The implication meant that work hours within and
outside city limits would be recorded separately
in order to determine the proper taxable income
amount.
The 1950’s also heralded the first signs of
Philadelphia’s economic decline. The boom years
of World War II were now long gone, and the
city began to fail to meet projected wage tax
revenue estimates. In 1956, Mayor Dilworth
proposed a .5 percent wage tax increase. The
Philadelphia Bulletin cited the city “using huge
operating surpluses in recent years to expand its
services” as the need to increase the wage tax
rate.18  With the potential of surpluses
diminishing each year, the city sought rate
increases as a method of maintaining the general
budget. In 1957, the wage tax increased from 1 1/4
percent to 1 1/2 percent.
THE 1960’S
In the 1960’s, the Philadelphia wage tax grew in
leaps and bounds, as tax supporters continued to
score legislative and legal victories. In 1960,
Mayor Tate called for further increases in the
wage tax rate. The Mayor, who originally sought
another .5 percent increase, was able to negotiate
a .2 percent add-on in 1961. At the same time, the
city also began to vigorously pursue delinquent
wage tax collections from non-residents. The city
expected to recoup over $1 million in lost revenue
through strict enforcement.19 The city continued
                                                                
17  Lefferts v. City of Philadelphia, 88 D. & C. 345,
(1954).
18  “Mayor’s Plan for Tax Boost Hits Opposition.”
Philadelphia Bulletin  20 Jul. 1956.
19  “City Expects Suburban Campaign to Raise
Wage Tax Yield a Million.”  Philadelphia Bulletin
7 May 1961.
to defend the wage tax from the point of view that
it was the only equitable means of properly
funding a rapidly growing city bureaucracy. In
1965, in defense of wage tax increases, Mayor
Tate stated,
“The growth and redevelopment of our cities to
keep pace with modern demands and to serve all
the citizens requires fiscal programming of the
most far-seeing kind. In Philadelphia’s
comprehensive fiscal planning, the success of
the wage and earning tax is a vital factor.”20
The state continued to be active as well. In 1961,
the legislature passed an amended version of the
Sterling Act. Although application of the act to
second class cities was already moot due to the
sunset clause, Governor Lawrence signed a
version that omitted any reference to second
class cities. The Governor further eased
Philadelphia’s collection concerns by signing a
bill permitting state agencies to directly withhold
wage taxes from employees within city limits. The
tax revenue would then be remitted to the city. In
the past, Philadelphia attempted to collect taxes
directly from individuals. The state also passed
an amended version of Act 481 in 1965. Act 511,
the “Local Tax Enabling Act”, reconferred the
taxing authority granted through the “Tax
Anything Act” while mandating that employers
automatically deduct wage taxes from the
payrolls, and remit the money to the taxing
authority.
There appears to have been very little concern at
the state or local level about the economic
distortions caused by the wage tax. On
September 29, 1961, the Philadelphia Bulletin
wrote, “There is always the danger of pegging
the wage tax at so high a rate that it would drive
small businessmen and professional people out
of the city. But no one expects it to go that
high.”21
State legislators opposed to the wage tax,
continued to seek limits on Philadelphia’s taxing
authority. By the 1960’s, the Pennsylvania House
had institutionalized a perennial tradition of
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Rebirth.” Philadelphia Bulletin  29 Sep. 1961.
The Sterling Act: A Brief History March 1999
Pennsylvania Economy League page 7
introducing legislation to exempt non-residents
from wage taxes. During the decade, a bill of this
type appeared on numerous occasions including
the 1963, 1965 and 1967 legislative sessions - all
attempts were to no avail.
Legislators also began to pursue innovative
means of limiting the city’s taxing authority. In
1967, state legislators introduced two bills to limit
the power to tax non-residents. One bill sought a
rate cap of one-half the rate imposed upon
residents, while the other bill would have
repealed provisions of Act 481, which allowed
Philadelphia’s, wage tax to supersede taxes
imposed by surrounding municipalities. The city
would instead be required to reimburse the
municipality for an amount equal to the imposed
tax. The primary supporter of the rate cap bill,
Rep. Benjamin H. Wilson (R - Warminster) stated,
“The Sterling Act imposes no maximum statutory
limit on its wage tax and City Council could
conceivably raise it to any limit. On the other
hand, the Local Tax Enabling Act, which applies
to other municipalities, has a maximum statutory
limit and I believe it may be prudent for the
General Assembly to enact a maximum for
Philadelphia.”22  The bill never managed to
escape committee, and died as a result of the end
of the legislative session. Although the idea was
reintroduced by Rep. John Stauffer (R - Chester),
a vote to move the bill from the Urban Affairs
Committee to the House floor failed by a vote of
104 - 70. The bill, calling for reimbursements to
surrounding municipalities, also failed to muster
the necessary support.
In the 1960’s legislative opposition to the wage
tax moved to the federal realm for the first time.
With the knowledge of dim prospects, Senator
Clifford P. Case (R-NJ) introduced a resolution in
the U.S. Senate, calling for a constitutional
amendment that would forbid states and cities
from levying taxes upon non-residents. At the
time, each of the 34 states with income taxes
imposed the tax upon non-residents, thus making
support difficult to garner. In 1968,
Representative John Hunt (R., Pitman), whose
district included parts of Gloucester and Camden
counties, introduced a bill prohibiting taxation of
                                                                
22  “Wilson Wants Wage Tax Limit for 2 Cities.”
Philadelphia Bulletin  21 Jul. 1968.
non-residents. Hunt’s bill suffered a similar fate
as Case’s legislation.
In 1960, the Philadelphia wage tax rate stood at 1
1/2 percent. By the close of the decade, the rate
had increased to 3 percent.
THE 1970’S
In 1975, the Philadelphia Bulletin referred to the
wage tax as “the most contested local tax in the
country.”23  The 1970’s became a time of virtual
war between the City of Philadelphia and non-
resident opponents of the wage tax. - particularly
those in New Jersey. In November 1970, Camden
Assemblyman Jim Florio (D - Camden) introduced
a bill to authorize the state attorney general to
challenge the constitutionality of the wage tax.
Although prior court rulings had declared the tax
constitutional, Florio sought to pursue the case
from a different angle. The Assemblyman raised
the question of whether it is fair for the city to
impose a tax of equal rate upon non-residents
even though non-residents do not receive
municipal benefits in the same proportion. In
March 1971 Governor Cahill ordered the state
attorney general to “commence action” against
the Philadelphia levy.24 In December, U.S. District
Court Judge Mitchel H. Cohen dismissed the suit.
In his opinion, Judge Cohen wrote, “Just as
industry and business select sites providing
favorable tax consequences, so too, should an
individual in his selection of his place of
employment.”25 The suit was not appealed to the
U.S. Supreme Court.
The wage tax was embattled on other sides as
well. Representative Richard McClatchy (R -
149th Dist.) sponsored the recurring
Pennsylvania state legislature proposal to limit
the non-resident wage tax in 1971. Like its
predecessors, the bill suffered a similar fate.
Nevertheless, it was one among several failed
bills that shifted the focus from the unsuccessful
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strategy of eliminating the non-resident wage tax,
to imposing a rate cap.
In 1973, the state House of Representatives
scored a small victory against the wage tax. By a
vote of 135 to 54, the House voted to eliminate
Philadelphia’s power of pre-emption by requiring
the city to reimburse surrounding municipalities
at a rate equivalent to that which would have
been collected from residents of their respective
areas.26  Strong opposition in the State Senate
nullified any chances of the bill’s success
though. In the October 17, 1973 Philadelphia
Bulletin, the State Senate Majority Leader
Thomas Lamb stated, “There’s no way a bill like
that is going to get anywhere here.”27
Efforts to limit the non-resident wage tax would
eventually prove to be successful. In 1976,
Senator Craig Lewis (D - Bucks County)
proposed a temporary 3 percent wage tax limit for
non-residents. At no time in the future could the
rate exceed 75 percent of the rate imposed on city
residents. Lewis intended to capitalize on an
opportune time, for Mayor Rizzo was pushing for
passage of a large tax package that required state
approval. Although Lewis’ original draft faced
strong opposition, a milder version was
eventually passed. On December 21, 1977,
Savings Clause and Limitations 7359 was passed.
The non-resident tax rate could no longer exceed
4.3125 percent until the residential rate reached
higher than 5.75 percent.  At that point, the non-
residential rate could be increased but could not
exceed 75 percent of the residential rate.  The
clause stated,
...the provisions of such ordinance imposing a
tax rate in excess of four and five-sixteenths per
cent with respect to persons who are not legal
residents of such city shall be deemed suspended
and without any validity to the extent that such
tax rate exceeds the tax rate of four and five-
sixteenths per cent on income of such
nonresidents.  And such excess tax rate
provisions shall remain suspended and without
validity until such date as the city of the first
class, by ordinance, imposes a rate of tax on
income of both legal residents and nonresidents
                                                                
26  “House Votes Tax Break for Suburban Towns.”
Philadelphia Bulletin  17 Oct. 1973.
27  Ibid.
of such city in excess of the tax rate imposition of
five and three-fourths per cent per year…such
suspension is removed and the rate deemed
valid only to the extent the tax rate imposed on
income of such nonresidents does not exceed
seventy-five per cent of the tax rate imposed by
ordinance per year on the income of legal
residents…
Congressman John Hunt continued to attack the
wage tax at the federal level as well. Hunt’s latest
attempt sought a 50 percent reduction in non-
resident tax rates in Federal areas and a 33.3
percent reduction for non-residents who lived in
non-federal areas. The legislation would also
credit the non-resident the amount paid in wage
taxes to the area of residence income tax. In 1971,
the New Jersey Senate adopted a resolution
calling for prompt action on Hunt’s bill, but once
again, the legislation would eventually die.
Despite strong and somewhat successful
opposition during the 1970’s the Philadelphia
wage tax continued to grow. In 1971, Mayor Tate
passed a .3 percent increase which brought the
effective rate to 3.3125. At the end of the decade,
the residential rate was 4.315 percent.
THE 1980’S & 1990’S
By the 1980’s, the majority of formative policy
and legislation regarding local taxing authority
had been passed. Under the Thornburgh and
Casey administrations, statewide “tax reform”
became a popular buzzword, and a number of
attempts were made to pass comprehensive
reform packages.
Governor Thornburgh appointed a task force to
examine statewide tax reform. With regard to the
wage tax, the task force wrote, “it should be
noted that equalizing the extent of nonresident
taxation in Philadelphia and other municipalities
is not necessarily desirable. Philadelphia may
indeed have special attributes and circumstances
that would make such equalization undesirable as
judged by either the benefit principle or equity
criteria.”28
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The Casey tax reform proposal would have
limited the residential and non-residential wage
tax rates to 4.5 percent and 3.95 percent
respectively. It would have also required the city
to reimburse municipalities of residence for
employees paying the non-residential wage tax.
The reimbursement would have equaled .25
percent of an employee’s quarterly income
earned within the city.29 The Casey tax reform
proposal went down to a crushing defeat in a
statewide referendum.
On several occasions, bills were passed by the
House or Senate which would have placed caps
on non-residential and residential wage tax rates,
but these attempts never failed to garner the
necessary support of both chambers. For
example, in 1982, a measure failed in the Senate
that would have reduced the non-resident wage
tax rate to 2.9 percent. Senator Vince Fumo (D.,
Phila.) stated that such a bill would be
“devastating” to the local economy.30  The wage
tax rate hit its peak in 1983 when it climbed to 4.96
percent for residents of Philadelphia. The non-
resident rate remained at 4.3125 percent. This was
the first time that a differential would exist
between residential and non-residential wage tax
rates.
Despite a lack of meaningful legislation, the
1980’s were a time of important court actions. In
1981, a Federal Judge dismissed a suit filed by a
New Jersey resident that claimed the city
discriminated by not applying the wage tax to
visiting athletes and entertainers. Judge James T.
Giles wrote that the suit failed to demonstrate,
“intentional, invidious discrimination.”31  The
City of Philadelphia would later attempt to collect
back taxes from a number of visiting athletes. In
1983, Thomas A. Leonard, an independent
candidate for Mayor challenged the
constitutionality of the new two-tiered wage tax
system in Commonwealth Court. Leonard’s claim
was based on the state uniformity clause which
states, “All taxes shall be uniform, upon the same
class of subjects, within the territorial limits of the
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authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and
collected under general laws.” Judge Crumlish Jr.
ruled that the two-tiered tax was unconstitutional.
In his decision, Judge Crumlish wrote,
We are of the opinion that the non-resident
distinction is without a difference, an artificial
one which splits in two the class of wage
taxpayers in the City of Philadelphia. In our
view, the legislature and City Council have
arbitrarily created an unjust burden and have
discriminated against those members of a class
who, because of an invisible boundary line, live
by command or choice within the city’s limits.
Despite his ruling, Crumlish refused to order an
injunction against collection of the tax. “With
regret”, Crumlish wrote, “If this court enjoins the
collection of the current wage tax, a $60 million
deficit would result, causing an unbalanced
budget, and propel the city into a state of fiscal
paralysis.”32  The case would later be appealed to
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, where Judge
Crumlish’s decision was overturned. In a 7-0
ruling, the Court claimed that the two-tier tax was
constitutional. Justice John P. Flaherty wrote,
The tax scheme in question meets constitutional
requirements for there exists the requisite basis
for treating residents and non-residents of
Philadelphia as separate classes of wage
earners subject to different tax rates. The
legitimate distinction between those classes
rests not upon the superficial fact that one class
resides in Philadelphia while the other resides
elsewhere, but rather, at a deeper level of
analysis, upon significant differences between
the two classes of wage earners that provide
reasonable and concrete justifications for their
being taxed at different rates.33
In 1994, Councilman Wallace H. Nunn (Delaware
County Council) proposed that the County
Solicitor examine the possibility of suing the
Commonwealth on the grounds that the County
cannot tax its citizens in a “fair and modern”
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manner, as prescribed by the 14th amendment.34
The suit would have directly pursued the Sterling
Act itself, and the tax preemption that allows
non-residents paying the Philadelphia wage tax
to obtain a credit against the income tax imposed
within the area of residence. The lawsuit was
never pursued.
CONCLUSION
In 1940, Mayor Lamberton stated, “We are not
wedded to this form of tax [wage]. It is an
experiment which gives us a year to survey the
field and see if there is some better way to raise
the necessary money.”35  58 years later, the
experiment continues. Although the wage tax has
undergone a number of legislative and court
challenges over the years, it retains an extremely
strong presence and constitutes a great portion
of the City of Philadelphia’s revenue base. It also
continues to force business and jobs to leave
Philadelphia’s boundaries, while deterring any
meaningful regional answers to economic
development issues. Through a historical
analysis of the state and local legislative actions
as well as court challenges, a number of trends
have become apparent:
1) Most court challenges were never filed directly
against the Sterling Act or Act 511. Until
Councilmember Nunn’s idea of testing the
constitutionality of the Sterling Act on the basis
of the 14th amendment, lawsuits directly attacked
the City Council ordinance that created the
residential and non-residential wage tax.
2) The failure of state legislation to impose
restrictions upon the Philadelphia wage tax
became a regular rite of passage, but opposition
seemed to lessen as time proceeded. With an
impending loss of representatives due to
population loss, the state may revisit this
strategy with greater success in coming years.
3) The federal government had very little success
in regulating local taxing power and the
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Supreme Court appeared to have little interest in
involvement with this issue. After the 1970’s,
efforts at the federal level to limit local taxing
authority were virtually non-existent.
4) Wage taxes and their enabling legislation have
been extremely impervious to legal challenges.
The best chances for limiting legislation appears
to lie within state and local legislatures.
